Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the now long-defunct Habsburg Empire was among the leading powers of Europe, with a share of roughly 13 per cent in total European population and producing about 10 per cent of Europe's GDP. By the end of the First World War, the empire had militarily, politically and economically collapsed. The Treaties of St Germain (1919) and Trianon (1920) There is an extensive historiography, reaching back into the years immediately after the First World War, which examines the rise and impact of nationalism in the Habsburg Monarchy as a multinational state. 3 Irrespective of different analytical perspectives, the centrifugal, disintegrative forces of intra-empire nationalism have frequently been identified as key ingredients in a Habsburg story of 'imperial decline and dissolution ' . 4 Yet most of this historical literature has a lot more to say on the political origins and consequences of nationality conflicts within the empire than on their economic dimensions. A more recent literature on economic nationalism, especially on the cooperative movement within the Habsburg Empire has started to explore the formation of economic institutions along 3 Recent work includes Berend, History derailed; see also Rudolph and Good, eds., Nationalism and empire. 4 Jaszi, Dissolution; Kornish, 'Constitutional aspects'; Wank, 'Habsburg Empire' and 'Reflections'; Lieven, Russian Empire. ethno-linguistic lines. 5 However, we still know very little about the extent to which, say, Czechs or Germans, Poles or Hungarians were conditioned in their economic behaviour by language, nationality or loyalty to their region and if behaviour along such lines changed over time. What we do know from the mainly political historiography is that over the second half of the nineteenth century, and with some variation in intensity, antagonism between different national and ethnic groups gained in importance.
In contrast , there is another branch in the historiography that rejects the notion of the empire's fall as inevitable or the Habsburg state as having become unviable. 6 This seems to be supported by findings of the last thirty or so years of quantitative research into the economic development of the Habsburg Monarchy. Modern Economic
Growth began to emerge in the empire's western regions in the late eighteenth century and diffused gradually to the less advanced regions. This diffusion process went hand-in-hand with a spatial widening in market integration, stimulated by improvements in infrastructure during the nineteenth century. 7 Here the main message emerging is one of 'imperial stability' rather than decline. The issue then is whether and how these seemingly contradictory findings of intra-empire nationalism and intra-empire economic integration across regions can be squared.
In this paper we argue market integration proceeded asymmetrically, shaped by intensifying intra-empire nationality conflicts that, in a way, foreshadowed the dissolution of the Empire.
Drawing on price evidence from grain markets, we show that overall market integration improved over time. This tallies fully with previous findings in the literature and is consistent with the evidence on 5 were related to the effects of ethno-linguistic networks. Finally, the emerging pre-war regional integration patterns -shaped by nationalist sentiment -effectively anticipated the post-war settlement: the fault lines along which the Habsburg Empire was to break up eventually are evident in the price data about a quarter of a century or so before the outbreak of the First World War. We conclude that intensifying intra-empire nationality conflicts led to severely asymmetric patterns of market integration -economic nationalism mattered.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly sketches out key issues in the historiography on the significance of nationality conflicts in Habsburg economic development since 1867.
Section II explains our empirical approach to assess the effects of intra-empire nationalism on market integration and outlines our new dataset on prices, infrastructure, freight rates and measures of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity across the empire. Section III presents the results of estimating the impact of ethno-linguistic networks on inter-regional price gaps. Section IV includes several robustness checks on the finding that asymmetric patterns of market integration were driven by the effects of nationalism as distinct from communication effects. Section V explores briefly the extent to which the thrust of pre-war intra-empire economic nationalism is reflected in the post-war boundaries of the Habsburg successor states. The concluding section summarizes the main findings and looks to some wider implications.
I
The ultimate causes of Austria-Hungary's dissolution are still heavily disputed in the historical literature. However, nationalism features as a key variable in most approaches, irrespective of whether they adopt a structuralist perspective on imperial decline 9 , point to the failure of political elites at the centre to engineer reform and maintain legitimacy 10 or focus on the uncompromising pursuit of, effectively, components: trade costs that depend on distance (transport costs), trade costs that depend on networks (or related trade creating factors), and all causes of trade costs that are location-specific but not specific to any pair of locations 32 . If both distance-related and location-specific trade costs decrease over time, while the strength of networks stays high or even rises, the relative impact of the latter on trade will increase, which might result in patterns of asymmetric integration shaped by network boundaries and intensities.
The relationship between price dynamics and trade costs is examined within a simple analytical framework. Consider two cities i and j, letting P i,t and P j,t denote the respective prices of the good in cities i and j. Let (p it -p jt ) = gap ijt denote the percentage gap for the two prices at time t 33 . Assume further that the trade costs are proportional to the prices in the importing market place. In line with the recent economic geography literature let (1 − e −τ )P i,t be the trade costs, where τ > 0 is a cost parameter. Then, e −τ P i,t is the per-unit revenue when the good is sold in city i. Intuitively, τ depends positively on the geographical distance between the cities i and j.
Moreover, when network effects are present, τ also differs depending on whether or not the city populations are part of the same network.
Finally, trade from j to i is only profitable if P i,t e −τ > P j,t .This results in the condition: log(P i,t /P j,t ) = gap ij,t > τ. Hence, arbitrage from j to i takes place when the percentage price gap is larger than the cost parameter τ. Equivalently, one trades from city i to j only if gap ij,t < −τ. Thus, we obtain [−τ ; τ ] as a band of no-arbitrage. Within this band, no trade occurs that could reduce price differences between the two markets because trade costs exceed possible arbitrage profits.
Obviously, the size of this band increases with τ, which in turn will depend on several factors such as transport costs. In the literature, this trade cost view is often referred to as a weak form of the law of one price.
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The quantitative analysis builds on four new data sets: grain prices, railway distances, railway freight rates and language statistics.
The main characteristics of the data are set out below.
Grain Prices. We use annual current wholesale prices for five types of grain (wheat, rye, barley, oats, corn) in twenty major cities of the empire to examine the integration of the Habsburg economy over the period 1878-1910. 35 Grain prices are given in the original sources in the same currency for all cities but sometimes for different volume or [ the impact of changes in freight rates over time, the effect of using transport cost so computed as compared to the proxy of simple railway distances is quite straightforward: given a common terminal component, average transport costs per kilometre decline in distance. Figure 1 illustrates the combined effect of falling freight rates and shortening distances over the course of the late nineteenth century.
The greatest gains in terms of declining freight costs were made over the longest distances, here exemplified by the Innsbruck-Czernowitz connection.
36 See the sources listed under Railway Distances . 37 Schulze, 'Regional Income Dispersion'. 38 Noyes, American Railroad Rates.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Languages. For each of the twenty cities we reconstruct the composition of its population by language, taking account of the nine major languages spoken across the empire. We use 'main language spoken' (Austrian cities) and 'mother tongue' (Hungarian cities) as proxies for urban populations' ethnicity. 39 Table 1 reports population composition by language and shows the extent of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity both within and across the twenty cities in the sample.
The data, extracted from the official (decadal) censuses, refer to the population within the boundaries of a city and that of the immediately adjacent or surrounding administrative district(s). Given the widening over time of the geographical and administrative boundaries of some of the cities (especially, Budapest, Prague and Vienna), this makes for more stable and meaningful 'catchment areas'. The most striking feature here is the pronounced heterogeneity across the cities and, in some cases, the shifts in population shares held by the different national groups. We use the language data to construct a bilateral measure of ethno-linguistic similarity (or 'matching probability') of the two cities in any one of the 190 city-pairs as an independent variable. Section IV below offers robustness checks on this variable's explanatory power.
[ Table 1 about here]
How did grain prices in Austria-Hungary evolve over time? [ Figure 3 about here]
The evidence so far suggests that, first, city-pairs with a common post-war border were apparently already in 1878 somewhat better integrated than other pairs, which can be explained partly in terms of their different average distances. Second, price dispersion declined with some fluctuation within all 'national' city groups along similar paths. But, third, the percentage gap between 'global' and 'within' price dispersion was increasing during 1878-1910, from about 30 per cent to more than 50 per cent: integration became progressively asymmetric over the late nineteenth century.
To explore such asymmetric integration and its origins systematically, we examine a balanced panel of price ratios between all 190 possible city-pairs in our sample, drawing on a total pool of more than 10,000 observations. The analysis of the price dynamics in this panel has to take into account that trade costs imply a noarbitrage band in relative prices and hence non-linearities. Moreover, we need to focus on the cross-section, whilst allowing for productand city-specific factors and -crucially -allowing for structural change over time. The basic idea is that on average, higher trade costs should limit the scope for arbitrage and hence increase the price gap between any pair of cities. Trade costs, in turn, can be decomposed and we distinguish three categories: trade costs that depend on distance (transportation costs), cost components related to networks, and trade costs that are city-specific. We estimate the following simple specification:
where raildistance is the railway distance between two cities i and j in kilometres, language is a bilateral measure of ethno-linguistic similarity between city populations, city is a full set of dummies over all cities g to capture unobservable city-specific factors, while ε and n is the total number of language groups (in our case n = 9). This is equivalent to summing up over all possible same language encounters between individuals from the two different cities in each pair and dividing by the total number of all possible encounters for that city-pair.
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This 'matching probability' varies between 0 (no similarity between two cities i and j) and 1 (no differences). For example, for 1910 the lowest score is 0.0003 for the city-pair Lemberg-Debreczen, the highest is 0.9864 for Graz-Linz. Note that, similar to Rauch and
Trindade, we use language as a proxy for membership in a specific ethno-linguistic network, say Czech or Hungarian, rather than as a control for the costs of communication. 42 We explore the crucial differences in Section IV below.
III
To assess the evidence of asymmetric integration across the Habsburg regions, we estimate equation (1) using a generalised least squares estimator, which allows for heteroskedastictity in the crosssection. We start by pooling over all five grains and over the whole period 1878-1910. Reported standard errors are based on White's period robust coefficient variance estimator throughout, to accommodate for serial correlation in the price data. [ Table 2 about here]
As hypothesized, we find that, whilst controlling for unobservable city-specific effects, price differentials increased significantly in distance between the cities and decreased in the ethno-linguistic match between their populations. The coefficient on language is negative (i.e. the larger ethnic congruency between cities, the smaller the price gap) and highly significant, which here is interpreted as evidence of trade costs related to ethnic networks.
This finding is robust to the theoretically and empirically preferable use of time-varying transport costs instead of railway distances. We re-estimate equation (1), replacing raildistance by freightcost, a measure that fully accounts for inter-temporal changes in both distances (due to the extension of the railway network over time) and freight rates. 
where D 1 is an intercept dummy for 1895-1910. The results are set out in Table 3 , column 1.
[ Table 3 We can take this into account by adding to model (3) a set of timevarying city effects, to capture city-specific integration or disintegration shocks. Table 3 , column 2, shows that the introduction of time-specific city-effects does not alter the results.
It is straightforward to show that the effect exercised by ethnolinguistic networks on the pattern of market integration in the two decades prior to the Great War was considerable. A one-standard deviation decrease in matching probability implied ceteris paribus a stronger increase in (log) grain price-spreads than a one standard deviation increase in (log) freight costs. Put differently, the estimated effect of halving the matching probability would have increased the (log) grain price-spreads by 27% as compared to an increase of roughly 9% in response to doubling the average (log) freight costs. 46 We conclude that city-and time-specific differences in integration -such as varying degrees of integration with neighbouring regions -cannot explain the observed asymmetric integration within the Habsburg economy. However, the extent of ethno-linguistic congruence between locations, measured as a matching probability, is a factor that can.
46 To see this, define the probability of non-matching as (1-language), which essentially only inverts the sign of the estimated coefficients. A doubling of this variable will on average have the effect of (-1)*2*0.1492 = 0.2984 (see table 3, column 2). This translates into a 25% increase in the average log-price-spread as compared to a 2*0.0486=0.0978 or a 8.9% increase in response to doubling average (log) freight costs.
IV
The argument here is that language statistics can capture membership in ethno-linguistic networks, which in turn help explain the emerging pattern of asymmetric integration within the late nineteenth century Habsburg economy. However, for this argument to hold, one needs to be able to distinguish between 'community effects' and 'communication effects' of membership in an ethnolinguistic network. Networks can provide market information, which should be facilitated by the ability to speak a common or at least a very similar language. where SW200 is the index of lexicostatistical similarity between languages k and l based on the Swadesh-200 list of basic words as 47 Rauch and Trindade, 'Ethnic Chinese networks'. 48 Greif, 'Contract enforceability'; Rauch and Trindade, 'Ethnic Chinese networks'. 49 Dyen, Kruskal and Black, 'Indo-European Classification'. used in Dyen et al. 50 For example, the SW200 index is 0.660 for Table 4 , column 1, confirms this. The coefficient on the communications variable is either insignificant or of the wrong sign while the network effects captured in the matching probability (language) remain large and significant for the post-1894 period as before. Hence the evidence suggests that it was not communication as such that was the problem but rather growing conflict between distinct ethno-linguistic groups. Asymmetric integration was an outcome of intra-empire economic nationalism.
[ Table 4 about here]
However, one cannot exclude the possibility that this result of powerful community effects may be driven by the specific metric of a 'matching probability' used here. To deal with this issue we can define 50 Hungarian is not part of the Indo-European language family. We therefore set the index to zero for all pair-wise combinations with Hungarian, which tends to understate the ability to communicate between city populations. Similarly, we neglect the fact that many people will have been able to speak more than one language. This again leads us to underestimate the ability to communicate between city populations.
an alternative bilateral index of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity that is similar to a Herfindahl-index:
If both cities have an identical ethno-linguistic composition the index equals zero. If there is no overlap in the ethno-linguistic composition, the index equals one as its maximum. Like the initial matching probability, it varies between 0 and 1 and so reflects the idea that trade costs between a pair of cities are expected to increase in the ethno-linguistic heterogeneity between them. 51 As shown in Table 4 , column 2, the results remain unchanged compared to column 1. Thus the finding of strong community effects is robust to alternative measures of ethno-linguistic networks. Table 5 where column 1 refers to just two grains (wheat and rye) for which price data are available for all years and locations; column 2 refers to all five grains where the number of observations is smaller due to missing price data for some grains and city pairs.
[ Table 5 about here]
In both cases, the coefficient on spreadchange is highly significant: the larger the change in bilateral price differentials over time, which is unexplained by a change in transport costs (or distance-related trade costs), the higher the probability of a post-1918 border between two cities. This finding is far from trivial.
Common sense would suggest that the probability of any two cities to be separated by a border after the war should increase in their geographical distance and distance-related trade costs. The new evidence presented here shows that after controlling for this, the pattern of price dynamics helps predicting the future political borders.
If it was economic nationalism that drove asymmetric integration (and widening relative price differentials) in the pre-war period, then it is not too far fetched to hypothesize that it was pre-war economic nationalism that, effectively, shaped the lines along which the empire broke-up of in the wake of the First World War.
VI
In this paper we argue that two seemingly contradictory strands in the literature -one emphasizing the centrifugal impact of growing intra-empire nationalism, the other stressing significant improvements in market integration across the empire -can be reconciled. The process of overall market integration across the Habsburg domains, though ongoing, was profoundly asymmetric:
some localities were more rapidly and deeply integrating with each other than others -and 'national biases' played a key role in that.
Empire-wide absolute declines in price differentials between regions or towns went thus hand-in-hand with profound regional differentials in relative integration (or even relative disintegration). The extent of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity across regions and cities became a force making for asymmetric intra-empire market integration from the late 1880s, early 1890s onwards, roughly in line with the time pattern suggested by the historiography of rising national conflict across the empire. This, the analysis suggests, was the outcome of two factors, in particular. First, as markets became more closely integrated as a result of declining transport costs, the relative importance of other non-distance related barriers to inter-regional exchange, such as ethnic or linguistic differences, increased. Second, the absolute importance of these differences rose with increasingly ethnically-based forms of social and economic organisation such as trade co-operatives, especially from the mid-1880s. 1 8 9 0 1 8 9 1 1 8 9 2 1 8 9 3 1 8 9 4 1 8 9 5 1 8 9 6 1 8 9 7 1 8 9 8 1 8 9 9 1 9 0 0 1 9 0 1 1 9 0 2 1 9 0 3 1 9 0 4 1 9 0 5 1 9 0 6 1 9 0 7 1 9 0 8 1 9 0 9 1 9 1 0 Wheat Rye Barley Corn Oats 
